译者按：关于哈马斯原最高政治领导人哈尼亚在伊朗首都德黑兰被暗杀的过程，不同组织和不同媒体给出了不同解读，最初伊朗当局说是导弹袭击，后来又说是发射的抛射弹，《纽约时报》则说是提前两个月就放好了爆炸装置。《犹太纪事报》(The Jewish Chronicle)驳斥了这些说法，给出了哈尼亚被刺杀的完整内幕，精确到每分钟。《犹太纪事报》拿到了这么详细的细节，可见，伊朗安全部门和武装力量部门都已经被彻底渗透了。
请看以下详细报道。
The full inside story of how Israel assassinated Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran – minute by minute
以色列在德黑兰暗杀伊斯梅尔·哈尼亚的完整内幕——详细到每一分钟
As has been universally assumed (although not confirmed by the Israeli government) Israel was indeed responsible for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran last week.
虽然以色列政府尚未证实，但普遍认为，以色列确实应对上周在德黑兰暗杀哈马斯领导人伊斯梅尔·哈尼亚(Ismail Haniyeh)负责。
But the JC can reveal that the explosive device placed under his bed was planted by two Iranians recruited by the Mossad from the Ansar al-Mahdi security unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the very people who were supposed to secure the building and its guests.
据《犹太纪事报》披露，安装在哈尼亚床下的爆炸装置是由两名摩萨德(Mossad)招募的伊朗人放置的，他们来自伊斯兰革命卫队的安萨尔·马赫迪(Ansar al-Mahdi)安全部队，本应负责保护这栋大楼及其宾客的安全。
The Iranians themselves realised this after the assassination, when the guards were seen on security camera footage on the day of the assassination moving stealthily in the hallway towards the room where Haniyeh planned to stay, opening the door with a key and entering the room.
暗杀发生后，伊朗人自己也意识到了这一点，因为在暗杀当天的监控录像中，有人看到这两名警卫在走廊上悄悄地走向哈尼亚计划下榻的房间，用钥匙打开房门并进入房间。
Three minutes later the guards (who were offered a six-figure sum each as well as immediate relocation to a northern European country) were captured on camera calmly leaving the room, going down the stairs towards the main entrance of the building, leaving and then getting into a black car. The guard at the parking lot checkpoint recognised them and opened the gate without asking any questions. An hour later they were smuggled out of Iran by the Mossad.
视频显示，3分钟后，这两名警卫(每人获得6位数的报酬，并立即被转移到北欧某国)平静地离开房间，下楼走向大楼正门，上了一辆黑色汽车离开了。停车场的警卫认出他们，没问任何问题就打开了大门。一小时后，他们被摩萨德偷运出了伊朗。
Reports have suggested that the device was placed in Haniyeh’s room weeks or months before the explosion. This is wrong. Security cameras show it was placed on the day of the explosion, at 4:23 pm - some nine hours before it was activated when Haniyeh entered his room. The explosion, which was set off remotely by a robot, took place after midnight, at exactly 01:37am local time.
有报道称，爆炸前几周或几个月，哈尼亚的房间里就放置了这个装置。这种说法是错误的。监控录像显示，爆炸装置是在爆炸当天下午4: 23安放的，大约九个小时后，当哈尼亚进入房间时才被引爆。午夜之后，当地时间凌晨1: 37，机器人遥控引爆了炸弹。
To prevent possible detection, the Mossad planted a flat brick explosive, 3 inches wide by 6 inches long, that was fastened to the bottom of the bed. To minimise harming innocent civilians, they used a bomb known for its precision which targeted only Haniyeh’s room. As a result, only one specific area of the building was damaged (see the image on this page).
为了防止被发现，摩萨德在床底放置了一个3英寸宽、6英寸长(译者注：相当于7.6厘米宽、15厘米长)的扁平砖型爆炸装置。为了尽量减少对无辜平民的伤害，他们使用了一种以精确著称的炸弹，只针对哈尼亚的房间。因此，大楼只有一个特定区域遭到破坏(见本页图片)。
Haniyeh’s assassination, which was decided on after October 7, necessitated a complicated set of arrangements from a network of Mossad spies dispersed throughout Tehran, including local Iranian collaborators who had been active in Iran long before the Gaza War. Over the past 20 years Israel has been gathering intelligence about Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. This intelligence, in addition to the recruitment of the two IRGC members enabled the success of the operation.
针对哈尼亚的暗杀行动是在去年10月7日之后作出的，这需要分散在德黑兰各地的摩萨德间谍网进行一系列复杂的安排，其中包括早在加沙战争之前就活跃在伊朗的当地伊朗合作者。过去20年来，以色列一直在收集有关伊朗发展核武器的情报。这些情报，加上招募的两名伊斯兰革民卫队成员，使这次行动得以成功。
Following the decision to carry out Haniyeh’s assassination, the Mossad began searching for a suitable opportunity to strike. It emerged when Haniyeh was invited to Tehran for the new Iranian president’s inauguration. The Mossad, with the assistance of intelligence unit 8200 (the IDF unit responsible for clandestine operations), intercepted phone calls between the organisers of the inauguration and the invited guests. When Haniyeh confirmed his arrival, the Mossad began executing the plan: eliminate Haniyeh in the guest house where he usually stayed during his visits to Tehran.
在决定暗杀哈尼亚之后，摩萨德开始寻找合适的下手机会。当哈尼亚受邀前往德黑兰参加伊朗新总统就职典礼时，机会出现了。摩萨德在情报单位8200(以色列国防军负责秘密行动的单位)的协助下，截获了就职典礼组织者与受邀嘉宾之间的电话。当确认哈尼亚抵达后，摩萨德开始执行计划：在哈尼亚访问德黑兰时通常下榻的宾馆里干掉他。
Mossad then sent its own agents to visit the area regularly to supply the operational logistics, map every street and alleyway, identify potential escape routes and check the building’s security measures. But the agents encountered difficulties when arriving in the area. The guest house was perched on a hill and surrounded by a forest of towering trees, which made it very difficult to observe the building clearly. But Israeli improvisation and creativity then kicked in. Five agents dressed themselves in green clothing and simply climbed the trees closest to the building while camouflaged by the green colour of the trees. Now the view was clear for them.
摩萨德随后派出自己的特工定期前往此地，为行动提供后勤保障，绘制每条街道和小巷的地图，确定可能的逃跑路线，并检查大楼的安全措施。但特工们在抵达该地区时遇到了困难。宾馆坐落在一座小山上，周围被参天大树包围，很难清楚地观察到大楼的情况。不过，以色列人的随机应变和创造力随即发挥了作用。5名特工穿上绿色衣服，爬上离大楼最近的树木，借助树木的绿色进行伪装。此时，他们的视野就清晰了。
Their role was to report as soon as Haniyeh arrived at the building, having memorised his car’s colour and license plate number. In the absence of a source inside the building who could inform them when Haniyeh had entered his room, another Mossad squad, also dressed in green, climbed into the branches of the trees and watched the building from an angle where the window of Haniyeh’s room was facing them. Their role was to notify the bomb operator as soon as the light went out in Haniyeh’s room.
他们的任务是在哈尼耶到达大楼后立即报告，并记住他的汽车颜色和车牌号。由于大楼内没有可以通知他们哈尼亚何时进入房间的线人，另一支同样身着绿色衣服的摩萨德小分队爬上树枝，从哈尼亚房间窗户正对着他们的角度观察大楼。他们的任务是一旦哈尼亚房间的灯熄灭，立即通知炸弹操作员。
At 01:20 all the invited guests arrived at the guesthouse. Haniyeh entered his room after exchanging goodbye hugs and handshakes, while his bodyguard stood outside his door to keep him safe. About 10 minutes later, the light was switched off, and a pastoral silence fell over the guest house area.
1: 20，所有受邀宾客都到达宾馆。哈尼亚与大家拥抱握手道别后进入自己的房间，他的保镖则站在门外保护他的安全。大约10分钟后，灯熄灭了，宾馆内一片寂静。
At that moment the bomb operator detonated an explosion that shook the entire structure. Haniyeh was killed immediately. His bodyguard, Wasim Abu Shaaban, was critically injured and subsequently died after heavy bleeding. (When his identity was checked by the Mossad before the operation they realised that the bodyguard was also a wanted terrorist - a senior member of Hamas’ military wing and one of the group of terrorists who had infiltrated Israel through a tunnel in 2014 and murdered five IDF soldiers.)
就在这时，炸弹操作员引爆了炸弹，整个大楼都在震动。哈尼亚当即被炸死，他的保镖瓦西姆·阿布·沙班(Wasim Abu Shaaban)受重伤，随后因大出血死亡。(摩萨德在行动前对他的身份进行核查时发现，这名保镖也是一名被通缉的恐怖分子，他是哈马斯军事部门的一名高级成员，也是2014年通过地道潜入以色列杀害5名以色列国防军士兵的恐怖分子团伙之一）。
Following the assassination, Iranian security authorities raided the guesthouse compound, arresting 28 senior military officials, and headquarters personnel who were present. All their electronic gadgets were confiscated to search their communications. The Iranian agents scanned the entire facility inch by inch and analysed the security cameras frame by frame. When they discovered that members of the IRGC were involved, they were not surprisingly enraged. The next day, when they threatened to inflict serious punishment on Israel, this was as much to do with the humiliation as because of the death of a senior Hamas official they were hosting.
暗杀发生后，伊朗安全部门突袭了宾馆大院，逮捕了28名高级军官和当时在场的革民卫队司令部人员。没收了他们所有的电子设备，以搜查他们的通信记录。伊朗特工对整个设施进行了逐寸扫描，并对监控摄像头进行了逐帧分析。当他们发现伊斯兰革命卫队成员参与其中时，自然是愤怒异常。第二天，他们威胁要对以色列进行严厉惩罚，不仅是因为一名他们接待的哈马斯高级官员的死亡，也是因为这是一种羞辱。
The Mossad had multiple opportunities to eliminate Haniyeh in Qatar. But Israel refrained from doing so because Qatar served as a vital negotiator between Hamas and Israel over the hostage crisis. Carrying out an assassination on Qatari soil might embarrass Qatar and jeopardise any future peace accord between Israel and Qatar that had been under discussion before the Gaza war.
摩萨德曾有多次机会在卡塔尔干掉哈尼亚。但以色列没有这么做，因为在人质危机中，卡塔尔充当了哈马斯和以色列之间的重要谈判代表。在卡塔尔领土上实施暗杀可能会让卡塔尔难堪，危及加沙战争前以色列和卡塔尔之间正在讨论的未来和平协议。
（图文来自网络）
